


Towards Practical MK-TFHE:

Parallelizable, Quasi-linear and Key-compatible

Hyesun Kwak, **Seonhong Min**, Yongsoo Song

Seoul National University, Seoul

Fully Homomorphic Encryption



- **Fully Homomorphic Encryption (HE)** supports arbitrary function evaluation on encrypted data.
- **Various Applications:** privacy preserving machine learning, private information retrieval, private set intersection ...

FHE for Multiple Parties

	MKHE	(n-out-of-n) Threshold HE
Key structure	$\bar{s} := (s_1 s_2 \dots s_k)$	$\bar{s} := \sum_{i=1}^k s_i$
Dynamic	Dynamic	Static
Communication	Independent	Interactive
Time/Space Complexity	Dependent to k	Comparable to single-key

Table: Comparison between Multi-Party HE schemes.

Previous Works

- Theoretical studies
 - LATV12, CM15, MW16, PS16, BP16, CZW17
 - (Mostly) GSW scheme
 - No implementations
- Practical schemes
 - CCS19¹ : TFHE/FHEW, quadratic complexity
 - CDKS19² : CKKS/BFV, quadratic complexity
- Better time complexity
 - KKLSS22³ : CKKS/BFV, quasi-linear complexity
 - **This work** : TFHE/FHEW, quasi-linear complexity

¹Chen, Chillotti and Song, Asiacrypt '19

²Chen, Dai, Kim and Song, CCS '19


³Kim, Kwak, Lee, Seo and Song, CCS '23

TFHE/FHEW scheme description

- FHE scheme that supports bits operations (NAND, AND, OR...).
- **Secret Key:**
 - LWE secret $\mathbf{s} = (s_1, \dots, s_n)$
 - RLWE secret $t \in R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^N + 1)$
- **Encoding:** $m \in \{-1, 1\} \mapsto \mu = \frac{q}{8}m \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
- **Decoding:**
$$\begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mu > 0 \\ -1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
- **Encryption:** $c = (b, \mathbf{a}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$ for $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n)$, $e \leftarrow$ small dist.,
 $b = -\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \mu + e \pmod{q}$.
- **Decryption:** $b + \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = \mu + e \pmod{q}$

Homomorphic Gate Evaluation (TFHE/FHEW)

- Each bit operation consists of the following pipeline:



- Linear Combination** : The linear combination corresponding to a Boolean gate is evaluated.
 - ex) NAND : $c = (\frac{q}{8}, \mathbf{0}) - c_1 - c_2$
 - output ciphertext contains a **large noise** e .
- Bootstrapping** : Reduces the size of noise for further evaluation.
 - ex) $\|e\| < \frac{q}{8} \rightarrow \|e'\| < \frac{q}{16}$
 - Consists of **Blind Rotation** and **Key Switching**

Blind Rotation

- **Input** : $\mathbf{c} = (b, \mathbf{a})$ such that $b + \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = \frac{q}{8}m + e \pmod{q}$.
- Let $\tilde{b} = \left\lfloor \frac{2N}{q} \cdot b \right\rfloor$, $\tilde{\mathbf{a}} = \left\lfloor \frac{2N}{q} \cdot \mathbf{a} \right\rfloor$.
 - ▶ $\tilde{b} + \langle \tilde{\mathbf{a}}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = \frac{2N}{8}m + \tilde{e} \pmod{2N}$.
- Pre-assign the coefficients to a polynomial tv , so that the constant term of $tv \cdot X^{\tilde{b} + \langle \tilde{\mathbf{a}}, \mathbf{s} \rangle} \in R_q = R/qR$ is $\frac{q}{8}m$.
 - ▶ Since $X^{2N} + 1 = 0, \pmod{2N}$ is naturally supported over the exponent.
- We can bootstrap the input ciphertext by computing $tv \cdot X^{\tilde{b} + \langle \tilde{\mathbf{a}}, \mathbf{s} \rangle}$, and extracting the constant term.
- Homomorphically multiply $[X^{a_i s_i}]_t$ to $tv \cdot X^b$ iteratively.
- This is the main bottleneck of TFHE/FHEW bootstrapping.

MKTFHE description

- **Setup:** Each i -th party samples...
 - LWE secret $\mathbf{s}_i = (s_{i,1}, \dots, s_{i,n})$
 - RLWE secret $t_i \in R$
- MK secret is the concatenation of each party's secret.
 - LWE secret $\bar{\mathbf{s}} = (\mathbf{s}_1 | \dots | \mathbf{s}_k)$
 - RLWE secret $\bar{t} = (t_1, \dots, t_k)$
- **Ciphertext:** $c = (b | \mathbf{a}_1 | \dots | \mathbf{a}_k) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{kn+1}$
 - $b + \sum_{i=1}^k \langle \mathbf{a}_i, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle \approx \mu \pmod{q}$.
- **Decryption:** $b + \sum_{i=1}^k \langle \mathbf{a}_i, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle = \mu + e$

Blind Rotation (CCS19)

- Homomorphically multiply monomials $[X^{a_i,j}S_{i,j}]_{t_i}$ to $tv \cdot X^b$ iteratively.
- Major building block: **Hybrid product**
 - ▶ homomorphic multiplication between MK-RLWE ciphertext and single-key RGSW-style encryption.
 - ▶ $\tilde{O}(kn)$ time complexity
- kn hybrid products, therefore overall time complexity is $\tilde{O}(k^2n^2)$.
- The timing **scales quadratically** as # of parties grows.

Our Idea

Motivation : Perform blind rotation party-wisely in a single-key manner, to achieve linear complexity $\tilde{O}(kn^2)$.

Challenge : No known homomorphic multiplication algorithm between multi-key and 'noisy' single-key ciphertexts.

Our Result : ① **Generalized External Product**

- A new homomorphic multiplication operation between MK-RLWE and generic single-key RGSW-like ciphertexts

② **Improved Hybrid Product**

- We improve Hybrid product by reducing the number of gadget decompositions.

③ **Faster Blind Rotation**

- The time complexity is reduced to $\tilde{O}(kn^2)$.
- Parallelizable, Key-compatible.

Generalized External Product (Simplified)

• Input:

- MK-RLWE encryption $\overline{ct} = (c_0, \dots, c_k)$ such that $\sum_{j=0}^k c_j \cdot t_j \approx m \pmod{q}$.
- RGSW-like (**noisy**) encryption \mathbf{C} of μ under secret t_i
- RGSW-like (**fresh**) encryption \mathbf{rlk} of t_i under secret t_i

• Idea:

- Multiply \mathbf{C} to each index of \overline{ct} to obtain MK-RLWE encryption $\overline{ct}' = (\mathbf{x}|\mathbf{y})$ of $m \cdot \mu$.
 - ▶ However, key is changed to $(1, t_i) \otimes (1, t_1, \dots, t_k)$!
 - ▶ i.e., $\langle \mathbf{x}, (1, t_1, \dots, t_k) \rangle + \langle \mathbf{y}, t_i \cdot (1, t_1, \dots, t_k) \rangle \approx m \cdot \mu \pmod{q}$
- Multiply \mathbf{rlk} to \mathbf{y} using hybrid product, and add to \mathbf{x} .
 - ▶ Key is changed back to $(1, t_1, \dots, t_k)$.

• Time complexity: $\tilde{O}(kn)$

Faster Blind Rotation

- **Our Algorithm:**

- 1 Compute $[X^{\langle \mathbf{a}_i, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle}]_t$ for each i -th party with RGSW-like ciphertext.
- 2 Multiply them to $X^b \cdot tv$ iteratively, using the generalized external product.

- **Time Complexity:**

- The first step requires $\tilde{O}(n^2)$ time complexity for each party.
- The second step requires k generalized external products.
- In total, the time complexity is $\tilde{O}(kn^2 + k^2n)$.
- In practice, $k \ll n$ and therefore **quasi-linear**.

- **Parallelizable:** The first step can be **algorithmically parallelizable**.

- **Key-Compatible:** The public key is identical to the single-key scheme, with an extra relinearization key.

Faster Blind Rotation




Figure: High-level overview of the blind rotation algorithm of MK variant of TFHE from CCS19 and Ours.

Timing Results

k	CCS19	Ours	Parallelized
2	0.24s	0.24s	0.17s
4	0.89s	0.88s	0.27s
8	3.32s	2.23s	0.35s
16	24.72s	5.65s	0.47s
32	-	13.94s	0.88s

Table: The elapsed time of our scheme and the CCS19 scheme.

- We achieve **4.38x** speedup without parallelization!
- **52.60x** speedup with parallelization!
- CCS19 doesn't support a practical parameter for ≥ 32 parties.

Timing Results




Figure: The elapsed time of our scheme and the CCS19 scheme.

Thank you for listening!



- Julia : <https://github.com/SNUCP/MKTFHE>
- Go : <https://github.com/sp301415/tfhe-go>