Faster TFHE Bootstrapping with Block Binary Keys

Changmin Lee<sup>1</sup>, Seonhong Min<sup>2</sup>, Jinyeong Seo<sup>2</sup>, Yongsoo Song<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Korea Institute for Advanced Study, Seoul <sup>2</sup>Seoul National University, Seoul

## Fully Homomorphic Encryption



- Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) supports arbitrary function evaluation on encrypted data.
- Various Applications: privacy preserving machine learning, private information retrieval, private set intersection ...

### Learning with Errors

• The most efficient FHEs to date are built on Learning with Errors (LWE) problem and its ring-variant Ring-LWE (RLWE).

• **RLWE**: 
$$(a, b) \approx_c \mathcal{U}(R_q^2)$$

▶ Variant of LWE over  $R_q = R/qR$  where  $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^N + 1)$ 

► 
$$a \leftarrow U(R_q)$$
,  $s \in R$ ,  $e \leftarrow$  small dist' over  $R$ 

• 
$$b = -a \cdot s + e \pmod{q}$$

#### • FHE schemes based on LWE/RLWE

- BGV / BFV / CKKS
- TFHE / FHEW

### **TFHE** description

• FHE scheme that supports bits operations (NAND, AND, OR...).

#### • Secret Key:

- LWE secret  $\mathbf{s} = (s_1, \dots, s_n)$
- RLWE secret  $t = \sum_{i=1}^{N} t_i X^{i-1}$
- Vectorized secret  $\mathbf{t} = (t_1, \dots, t_N)$
- All keys are sampled from binary distribution
- Encoding:  $m \in \{-1, 1\} \mapsto \mu = \frac{q}{8}m \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
- **Decoding**:  $\begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mu > 0 \\ -1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
- Encryption:  $c = (b, \mathbf{a}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$  for  $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n)$ ,  $e \leftarrow$  small dist.,  $b = -\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \mu + e$ .
- Decryption:  $b + \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = \mu + e$

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### Homomorphic Gate Evaluation

• Each bit operation consists of the following pipeline:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} c_1 \longrightarrow \\ c_2 \longrightarrow \end{array} \quad \text{Linear Combination} \longrightarrow c \longrightarrow \end{array} \quad \text{Bootstrapping} \longrightarrow c'$$

• Linear Combination : The linear combination corresponding to a Boolean gate is evaluated.


- ex) NAND : 
$$c = (\frac{q}{8}, \mathbf{0}) - c_1 - c_2$$

- output ciphertext contains a large noise e.

• **Bootstrapping** : Reduces the size of noise for further evaluation. - ex)  $||e|| < \frac{q}{8} \rightarrow ||e'|| < \frac{q}{16}$ 

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# TFHE Bootstrapping



 Blind Rotation : Homomorphically computes the decryption circuit on the exponent of X i.e., X<sup>b+(a,s)</sup>.

▶ Need Blind Rotation Key : Encryptions of  $s_i$   $(1 \le i \le n)$ 

• **Sample Extract** : Extract an LWE ciphertext from the resulting RLWE ciphertext.

• Key-Switching : Switch the secret key of the LWE ciphertext.

▶ Need Key-Switching Key : Encryptions of  $t_i$  ( $1 \le i \le N$ )

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## Our Contribution

Motivation : Most FHE schemes (BGV/FV/CKKS) make an additional assumption on key structure to obtain better efficiency.

- BGV/FV : Small noise growth in homomorphic multiplication.
- CKKS : Small depth for bootstrapping.

Our Result : We adapt similar approach to accelerate TFHE bootstrapping.

- Faster Blind Rotation
  - Sample LWE key from block binary key distribution

- Reduce the number of iterations.

#### Ompact Key-Switching

- Re-use the LWE key as a part of RLWE key
- Improve both time and space complexity

### **Blind Rotation**

#### Functionality

• Homomorphic evaluation of  $tv \cdot X^{b + \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i s_i} = tv \cdot X^{\frac{q}{8}m+e} \in R_q$ .

$$tv = -rac{q}{8}(1+X+\cdots+X^{N-1})\in R_q$$

Constant term of 
$$tv \cdot X^{\frac{q}{8}m+e} = \frac{q}{8}m$$
.

- Homomorphically multiply monomials  $X^{a_i s_i}$  to  $tv \cdot X^b$  iteratively.
- We need **n homomorphic multiplications** total.

### Previous Blind Rotation

• 
$$X^{a_i s_i} = egin{cases} X^{a_i} & (s_i = 1) \ 1 & (s_i = 0) \end{bmatrix} = 1 + (X^{a_i} - 1) s_i$$

- Using this key formula, we have  $[X^{a_i s_i}]_t = 1 + (X^{a_i} - 1)[s_i]_t$ 

- We iteratively multiply one monomial  $X^{a_i s_i}$  for **n** times.

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#### Observation

• Can we multiply 2 monomials simultaneously?

$$egin{aligned} X^{a_1s_1+a_2s_2} \ &=(1+(X^{a_1}-1)s_1)(1+(X^{a_2}-1)s_2) \ &=1+(X^{a_1}-1)s_1+(X^{a_2}-1)s_2+(X^{a_1}-1)(X^{a_2}-1)s_1s_2 \end{aligned}$$

- With this formula, the number of homomorphic mult reduces by half.
  - Requires RGSW encryption of s<sub>1</sub>s<sub>2</sub>
  - + the number of linear evaluation grows.
- What if we can ignore the case where  $s_1 = s_2 = 1$ ?
  - No additional blind rotation keys are required.
  - The number of linear evaluation remains same.
- Generalization: How about  $\ell$  monomials?
  - $\rightarrow$  Possible. If s is sampled from Block Binary Key Distribution...

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## Block Binary Keys

#### Definition (Block Binary Key)

•  $n = k\ell$  for two positive integers  $k, \ell > 0$ 

• 
$$\mathbf{s} = (B_1, \dots, B_k) \in \{0, 1\}^n$$

•  $B_i \leftarrow \mathcal{U}((1, 0, ..., 0), ..., (0, 0, ..., 1), (0, ..., 0))$ 

• At most one 1 in each block




Figure: Block Binary Key with  $\ell = 3$  and k = 6

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Block Binary Keys

• 
$$X^{a_1s_1} = \begin{cases} X^{a_1} & (s_1 = 1) \\ 1 & (s_1 = 0) \end{cases}$$
  
=  $1 + (X^{a_1} - 1)s_1$ 

 $\rightarrow$  Multiply 1 monomial with 1 mult and 1 add.

• 
$$X^{\sum_{i=1}^{\ell} a_i s_i} = egin{cases} X^{a_1} & (s_1 = 1, s_2 = 0, \dots, s_\ell = 0) \ dots \ X^{a_\ell} & (s_1 = 0, s_2 = 0, \dots, s_\ell = 1) \ 1 & (s_1 = 0, s_2 = 0, \dots, s_\ell = 0) \ = 1 + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} (X^{a_i} - 1) s_i \end{cases}$$

 $\rightarrow$  Multiply  $\ell$  monomials with 1 mult and  $\ell$  add.

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### **Our Blind Rotation**

$$a_{1}, \dots, a_{\ell} [s_{1}]_{t}, \dots, [s_{\ell}]_{t} \qquad a_{\ell+1}, \dots, a_{2\ell} [s_{\ell+1}]_{t}, \dots, [s_{2\ell}]_{t}$$

$$tv \cdot X^{b} - \times X^{\sum_{i=1}^{\ell} a_{i}s_{i}} - [tv \cdot X^{b+\sum_{i=1}^{\ell} a_{i}s_{i}}]_{t} - \times X^{\sum_{i=\ell+1}^{2\ell} a_{i}s_{i}} - [tv \cdot X^{b+\sum_{i=1}^{2\ell} a_{i}s_{i}}]_{t}$$

$$a_{(k-1)\ell+1}, \dots, a_{k\ell} [s_{(k-1)\ell+1}]_{t}, \dots, [s_{k\ell}]_{t}$$

$$\dots - \times X^{\sum_{i=(k-1)\ell+1}^{k\ell} a_{i}s_{i}} - [tv \cdot X^{b+\langle a, s \rangle}]_{t}$$

- Iteratively multiplies ℓ monomials with one homomorphic multiplication.
- Only **k** homomorphic multiplications are required!!
- However, not direct  $\ell$ -times speedup due to other operations.

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Security of Block Binary Keys

• Asymptotic Security : If the entropy of key distribution is sufficiently large, LWE is secure (Goldwasser et al).

– Entropy of block binary keys :  $(\ell+1)^k$ 

- **Concrete Security** : We conducted cryptanalysis considering the best-known lattice attacks.
  - Classical Dual
  - Meet-in-the-Middle
  - Taylor-made

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#### Parameters

- We set the parameters with 128-bit security level.
- As  $\ell$  grows,  $n = k\ell$  grows as well to secure enough entropy.

| $n = k\ell$ | N    | l | Dual  | MitM  | Taylor-made |
|-------------|------|---|-------|-------|-------------|
| 630         | 1024 | 2 | 128.8 | 139.7 | 128.8       |
| 687         | 1024 | 3 | 128.3 | 128.2 | 126.7       |
| 788         | 1024 | 4 | 128.6 | 128.0 | 127.4       |

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## Key-Switching

#### Functionality

• Switch the secret key of LWE ciphertext from t to s.

- For LWE ciphertext  $\mathbf{c} = (b, a_1, \dots, a_N)$  encrypted under  $\mathbf{t}$ , we compute  $\mathbf{c}' = (b, 0, \dots, 0) + \sum_{i=1}^N a_i \cdot \text{Enc}_{\mathbf{s}}(t_i)$ .
  - $Enc_{s}(t_{i})$ : Gadget encryptions of  $t_{i}$  under s  $(1 \le i \le N)$ .
  - $Dec_{s}(\mathbf{c}') \approx b + \sum_{i=1}^{N} a_{i}t_{i} = Dec_{t}(\mathbf{c}).$
- Complexity
  - Time : **N** homomorphic scalar multiplications.
  - Space: N key-switching keys

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## Compact Key-Switching

• If  $t_i = s_i$   $(1 \le i \le n)$ , we can replace  $\mathbf{c}'$  by

$$(b, a_1, \ldots, a_n) + \sum_{i=n+1}^N a_i \cdot \mathsf{Enc}_{s}(t_i)$$


• 
$$Dec_{\mathbf{s}}(\mathbf{c}') \approx b + \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i s_i + \sum_{i=n+1}^{N} a_i t_i = b + \sum_{i=1}^{N} a_i t_i = Dec_{\mathbf{t}}(\mathbf{c}).$$

#### Complexity

- ▶ Time : **N** − **n** scalar multiplications
- Space : N n key-switching keys

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## Compact Key-Switching



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
### Implementation & Result

|      | l     | n   | Bootstrapping  | Key Size |
|------|-------|-----|----------------|----------|
| TFHE | •     | 630 | 10.5 <i>ms</i> | 109 MB   |
| Ours | 2     | 630 | 7.0 <i>ms</i>  |          |
|      | 3     | 687 | 6.5 <i>ms</i>  | 60 MB    |
|      | 4 788 |     | 6.7 <i>ms</i>  |          |

Table: 128-bit Security level

- Implemented based on the TFHE library.
- We achieve 1.5-1.6x SPEEDUP!
- Key size is reduced by 1.8x!
- Source code is available at github.com/SNUCP/blockkey-tfhe

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